But one who, sopra opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, sicuro seek onesto win the people over onesto himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely preciso their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted onesto him than if he had been raised puro the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their affections sopra many ways, but as these vary according preciso the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for verso prince preciso have the people friendly, otherwise he has mai security mediante adversity.
Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him esatto make himself secure against verso few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when verso private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened preciso the Gracchi in Rome and puro Messer Giorgio Scali per Florence. But granted per prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed mediante adversity, who does not fail per other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged-such verso one will never find himself deceived durante them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.
Sopra the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised esatto the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amino amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed esatto receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind sicuro obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be durante doubtful times per scarcity of men whom he can esclusiva. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes durante quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish onesto die for him; but durante troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. Therefore verso wise prince ought preciso adopt such per course that his citizens will always durante every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.